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SOME REMINISCENCES OF JAPAN'S
COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION
KENZO TAKAYANAGI*
INTRODUCTION

On June 11, 1956, the Commission on the Constitution was created.
Its duties, as laid down by the enacting statute, were "to examine the

Constitution of Japan, to investigate and deliberate on problems related thereto, and to report the results to the Cabinet and through the
Cabinet to the National Diet."1
When the work of the Commission on the Constitution was approaching an end in 1964, there was informal talk about attempting an English translation of at least the Final Report. For a variety of reasons,
this idea failed to materialize. However, there have been at least two
excellent articles written by American scholars on the Commission.2
This paper will deal with some aspects of the Commission's work.
It will also include some conclusions that I have drawn from the work
of the Commission. In contrast to the well documented articles mentioned above, I have elected to write an informal essay in memoir
form. First, I will describe how I came to be a member and later
Chairman of the Commission. Then follows a description of the basic
policies adopted by the Commission to govern the conduct of its investigations and deliberations. Some comparisons are made with the
policies of the British Royal Commissions.
The major portion of my discussion will deal with the issue whether
the Constitution was imposed by force upon Japan by the Allied
Powers. As will be seen, I have concluded that there was no such
imposition. I will explain in detail my "collaborative theory" which
was presented for the first time in my Opinions on Some Constitutional
Problems.
I will conclude with discussion of a narrow issue: that concerning
Article 9 of the Constitution. It is also my view that Article 9 was
* LL.B. 1912, J.D., Tokyo University. Dr. Takayanagi was President of Seikei
University at his death in June 1967. He served as Chairman of the Commission
on the Constitution from 1957 to 1964.
SKentpO chsakaiir (The law establishing the Commission on the Constitution)
art. 2 (Law No. 140, 1956).-Ed.
'Ward, The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutionat

Change in iapan, 24 J. AsIAN STUDIEs 401-29 (1965); Maki, The Documents of
Japan's Commission on the Constitution,24 J.AsiAN STUDIES 475-89 (1965).
[961]
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not imposed upon Japan. Finally, I will set forth my "political manifesto" interpretation of this article.
How I

BECAME THE CHAIRMAN

On July 17, 1957, Mr. Ken'ichi Takeoka, Secretary General of the
Commission, asked me to accept membership on the Commission. I
asked him whether the Commission really intended to review the Constitution in a serious and nonpartisan spirit, or whether, as the Socialist Party charged, it was really intended to be a tool of the Liberal
Democratic Party to accomplish desired constitutional revision. If the
Socialists' allegation was true, I could better spend my time and
energy elsewhere. Takeoka said that the investigation and deliberation would be conducted in a truly nonpartisan spirit. Perhaps he had
to answer so for this was the declared policy of the statute establishing the Commission; the allegation of the Socialist Party, however
plausible, was a surmise based on the political background prior to
the enactment of that law. After some hesitation, I accepted Commission membership.
Some of my former colleagues at the University of Tokyo, as well
as other prominent professors of public law, appear to have been
similarly approached. They refused membership, probably believing
that the Commission was formed to revise the Constitution, an action
which they opposed. Even if they had become members of the Commission and taken a strong anti-revisionist position, they would have
been outnumbered by the revisionists who commanded a majority.
I had expected to serve as an ordinary member. As it was, I was
elected Chairman. When the first plenary meeting was convened on
August 13, 1957, the first order of business was the selection of a
chairman and two vice-chairmen. Two methods were suggested. The
first provided for an election at the plenary meeting. The other provided for the formation of a selection committee which would report
the results of its selection to the plenary meeting whose members
would vote for or against the selection. The latter method was
adopted. A selection committee consisting of five Diet members3 and
five nonpoliticians,4 officially called "persons of learning and experience," was set up.
'Hitoshi Ashida, Ichir6 Kiyose and Iwao Yamazaki of the Lower House, and
Buday6i Kogure and Giichi Murakami of the Upper House.-Ed.
'Ryigen Hosokawa, Masamichi R6yama, Kenz6 Takayanagi, K6gor6 Uyemura
and Teiji Yabe.-Ed.
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The Diet members voluntarily abstained from participation in the
selection, and the selection of the Chairman was left entirely to the
nonpoliticians of which I was a member. Teiji Yabe proposed the
Masamichi R6yama be Chairman. I fully supported this proposal.
However, R6yama refused to accept on the ground that he desired to
express his own opinions, a position which would be incompatible with
the chairmanship. He added that a chairman must be .impartial and
fair to all expressions of opinion, and a person with a judicial mind.
Then my name was mentioned, and I finally accepted the offer.
The selection of the committee was reported to the plenary session
and its recommendation was unanimously adopted by applause vote.
Iwao Yamazaki and Teiji Yabe were similarly elected Vice-Chairmen.It was in this manner that I was selected to serve as Chirman for a
period of some seven years.
THE PoLICIEs OF THE COMMISSION

As noted above, the enacting statute was little more than a general
directive to investigate and report. The establishment of such a commission was not entirely unprecedented, 5 but it was quite unusual. In
Japan, specific questions (shimon fiki) usually are posed for a commission with answers (to5slin) to be provided by it. But in this case,
the directive "to report the results" did not confine the Commission to

an answer to a specific question of constitutional revision; there was
no shimon jikd or tishin in the enabling statute.
The concrete organization of the investigative and deliberative process as well as the basic policies to be followed by the Commission
were left entirely to the discretion of the Commission. The basic policies in the conduct of such investigations and deliberations were decided upon as early as the end of the third plenary meeting which
was held on October 2, 1957; these were strictly abided by until the
Commission's work was completed. The policies were as follows:6
1. All Commission meetings, except those of the steering committee,
were to be open to the public.
'Similar legislation is Law No. 281, December 24, 1949, establishing a Commission for Investigating Local Government (generally known as the Kambe Commission).
'Although the basic policies of the Commission were decided at the very
beginning, the organization of its work into committees, subcommittees, sections,
and so on, was not completed at the initial stages. The latter grew gradually out of
practical necessity as the Commission proceeded in its work. One thing deserves
mention. The designation "committee" (jinkai) which was used in the fact-finding
stage was replaced by "section" (bukai) when the Commission entered the stage of
deliberations on policies.,,
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Such a policy was unprecedented in the history of commissions in
Japan. All of the Commission's operations thus proceeded in the public eye, not in camera. Leading newspapers throughout Japan assigned
special reporters to attend and make reports on all Commission meetings-plenary, committee, or subcommittee. Local newspapers sent
reporters to the public hearings held in their areas and the opinion of
each public speaker was fully reported.
2. The stenographic notes of the Commission's proceedings were to
be printed by the Printing Office of the Finance Ministry and adequate
steps were to be taken to make them easily accessible to any interested
person.
3. Persons who had practical experience with the Constitution, or
learned scholars, whether in or out of the government, were to be
called as witnesses to report their experiences or to express their opinions.
The aim of this policy was to ensure that investigation and deliberation would not be conducted by the Commission members alone but
with the participation of all other qualified persons.
4. Public hearings were to be held.
The aim of this policy was to acquaint the Commission members
with the practical experience and opinions of ordinary citizens.
5. In the absence of unanimity after due deliberation, the Commission was not to resort to majority rule. In such a case, the opinions
of all members were to be fairly reported with a full statement of their
reasons, whether these might be majority or minority opinions,
whether favoring or opposing revision.7

Personally, I was inclined to oppose revision in the near future; but I was not
opposed to "reviewing" the Constitution, and as a lawyer I was interested in
listening to the arguments of the other side. As soon as I became Chairman I was
loudly and vigorously denounced as the "gangleader" of the revisionists. This
was a strange phenomenon, but an indication as to how the Commission was to be
generally regarded by the revisionists and anti-revisionists alike. The former group
was angry or disappointed because the Commission failed to recommend revision,
and the latter group was placed in an awkward position because of their publicly
proclaimed prophecy about the final outcome of the Commission did not come true.
Members representing the Liberal Democratic Party on the Commission were
sometimes denounced by anti-revisionists as reactionary and anti-democratic simply
because they advocated revision. However, as Professor Ward has stated, "A number
of them were prewar liberals and men of unusual integrity and stature." Indeed, a
newspaper man once came to me and said, "Don't judge the Liberal Democratic
Party!" During the investigation and deliberation I observed that most of them preferred to listen and learn from what others said. They were generally less dogmatic
and self assertive than some of the academic members. Because they were amenable to
reason their opinions changed considerably. And because their common sense attitude
prevailed the Commission was able to conduct and finish its work comparatively
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This policy deviated from the usual practice of commissions in
Japan or elsewhere. In the ordinary situation, the opinion of the
commission is decided by majority vote or, in the case of a tie, by the
chairman. In view of the composition of the Commission, resulting
from the nonparticipation of the Socialist Party, it would have been
nonsensical to adopt the usual majority rule and thereafter declare
that the majority was in favor of constitutional revision. The adoption of a majority technique is certainly necessary for a policy-making
body, but the Commission did not consider itself as such. Its function
was to furnish materials for policymaking bodies. For such a purpose quality of opinions would be more important than numerical
strength.
In declaring this policy, the Commission also had in view the future
participation of the Socialist Party, which probably had assumed that
the majority rule would be adopted and that their minority opinions
would be rejected. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Party did not send
members to the Commission and discouraged others from appearing
as witnesses. However, eminent jurists who had refused to become
Commission members, such as Professors Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Shir5
Kiyomiya and Sakae Wagatsuma, appeared before the Commission as
witnesses at a later stage.
6. Fact-finding was to precede the policy discussion stage.
As a matter of fact, the fact-finding stage continued for some four
years, commencing with fact-finding regarding the making of the Constitution. This mode of procedure was unusual if compared with the
history of commissions in Japan. It was suggested by the practice of
the British Royal Commissions. I had long felt that commissions in
Japan should spend more time in fact-finding prior to the formulation
of recommendations. I proposed adoption of this policy in the steering
committee which readily agreed. The plenary session adopted the
proposal though a minority preferred the usual method.
The British technique seemed to have two beneficial results. If
members could agree on relevant facts after joint investigation, there
would be a tendency to agree on policy. The fact-finding process
would result, moreover, in a wealth of valuable information about
actual current practice which could not be found elsewhere.
The Commission failed to fulfill this first function. Its duties covered a wide field and only a few members studied the fact-finding
smoothly and without any disruption, despite the emotion-ridden disputes about the
"imposed" constitution and the issue of constitutional revision in general.
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materials with scrupulous care. The Commission, however, amply fulfilled its second function.'
The Commission considered it unwise to insist on cross-examination,
a procedure which makes the facts found in the British Royal Commissions especially trustworthy. It had no power to compel witnesses
to appear. It had to rely on the good will of witnesses who might
otherwise have hesitated to appear if subjected to severe crossexamination. Moreover, even Japanese lawyers, who must now employ
it in judicial trials, were not yet adequately trained in the art of
cross-examination.
WAS THE CONSTITUTION IMPOSED UPON JAPAN?

In 1946, when I participated in the making of the present Constitution, I believed that it was "imposed" upon Japan. I believed
that in the eyes of international law, the Instrument of Surrender was
conditional, not unconditional as in the case of Germany. The allied
policy of democratizing Japan, which was incorporated in the Potsdam
Declaration, was accepted by Japan. There is no doubt that such
acceptance was gained by the superior military force of the Allied
Powers, and that such policy was "forced" upon the Japanese government. Japan also agreed that during the occupation SCAP was to
be above the government of Japan, with power to order the latter to
adopt legislative measures it deemed necessary or proper for democratizing Japan. I was not then aware of the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 which established the Far Eastern Commission and
placed limits on the powers of SCAP, especially in regard to constitutional revision. I thought SCAP was entitled to impose any constitu' Professor Ward has stated, "The enduring value of the Commission probably
lies more in scholarship than in politics." Ward, supra note 2, at 418. And
Professor Maki has said:
I am prepared to say that anyone working on either a synthetic study or a

considerable array of specialized topics relating to Japanese history and society
in the period between the late 1940's and the early 1960's can ignore this
material at his own peril. In addition, they will be of considerable value to
scholars addressing themselves to such more specialized problems as the role
of the emperor, the state of fundamental human rights, virtually all issues
relating to national security (not only the relatively abstract idea of renunciation of war, but the structure and role of the Self-Defense Forces and the
National Security Council) and the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government. Students of other aspects of mid-20th century Japan will find

useful and stimulating, if not essential, material on a still broader range of
issues including such topics as the post-1945 role of women, changes in the
family system, the abolition of primogeniture and atomization of farmland
ownership, problems of small and medium business enterprises, the union movement, the assumption by the government of the cost to the student of compulsory

education, and juvenile delinquency.
Maki, supra note 2, at 487-88.
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tional text upon Japan in accord with the policy of democratization.
Moreover, the Constitutional Amendment Bill placed before the
Imperial Diet was accompanied by its "English translation" which
was easier to understand than the text of the original. This extraordinary procedure led me to believe that the so-called English translation was actually the original. I was not then aware where the original text had been drafted.
I imagined also that the acceptance by Japan of this "imposed"
Constitution might be one of the terms of the future peace treaty. So
also, I believed that Article 9 was imposed upon Japan in 1946 to
perpetuate the disarmament policy embodied in the Potsdam Declaration, by placing that policy in the more permanent Constitution. 9
All legislation for the democratization of Japan during the occupation was guided and supervised by SCAP. No legislation was enacted
by the "free will of the Japanese" in the sense that enactment was
accomplished "without any outside interference." If this were the
meaning of an "imposed" constitution (oshitsuke kemp6), no one
could deny it. But this kind of interference was not at issue.
The story was wide spread throughout Japan that when the SCAP
draft was delivered to the Japanese government on February 13, 1946,
General Whitney threatened to bring the Emperor before the International Tribunal to be tried as a war criminal if the government did
not adopt the SCAP draft. If true, such pressure would certainly have
amounted to oshitsuke (imposition by force). This story had its
origin in a statement of Dr. J6ji Matsumoto, who attended a meeting
with Whitney at SCAP headquarters on February 22, 1946." ° I

'However, as to the Bill's contents, I felt thdt it was a rather moderate revision
of the Meiji Constitution along democratic lines. The position of the Emperor
was retained, though so modified as to resemble the present British monarchy-a
"symbolic" Head of State as expounded in Bagehot's classic work.
The "bill of rights" of the Meiji Constitution was greatly strengthened and modernized, replacing the "rule by law" of the old Constitution with "rule of law."
Executive supremacy was replaced by legislative supremacy-an attainment which
Japanese liberals of the 1920's had ardently desired. The judicial independence of the
1889 Constitution, an innovation adopted from the West, was to be more adequately
guaranteed.
Indeed, apart from Article 9. the revision was not at all radical. It laid down a
set of sound political principles which I believed could serve as the cornerstone for
building a political system, assuring ordered progress. This view did not change
in 1957-1964, and was elaborated further in my "Opinion on Some Constitutional
Problems" presented before the plenary session in 1963. [Part of Professor Takayanagi's "Opinion" appears in this symposium, infra p. 979.-Ed.]
10Matsumoto was a minister of state in the Shidehara Cabinet from October 9,
1945, to April 22, 1946. He was chairman of the Investigating Committee of the
Constitutional Problems established by the Cabinet on October 13, 1945. A draft con-
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studied with scrupulous care the text of this statement made on July
7, 1954, at a meeting of the Constitution Investigation Committee of
the Liberal Democratic Party and could not help but feel that Dr.
Matsumoto's remarks on various points indicated an irrational prejudice against the SCAP lawyers."
Shigeru Yoshida, Ichir6 Shirasu, and Motokichi Hasegawa, 12 who,
like Matsumoto, were present at the meeting on February 22, 1946,
said that they did not remember Whitney ever making such a threat.
If such a serious threat involving danger to the person of the Emperor was really made, they would certainly have remembered it.
Of course General Whitney himself denied ever having made such a
remark, and he is fully supported by the Report to General MacArthur about the meeting in question. The Report, jointly written by
SCAP officers Charles Kades, Alfred Hussey and Merle Rowell an
hour or so after the meeting, was an attempt to record exactly what
was said by General Whitney on this occasion. 3
According to the Report, General Whitney expressly stated at the
meeting that the draft was not an order by General MacArthur, but a
recommendation which might or might not be adopted. As a matter of
fact, General Whitney was deeply concerned whether the Japanese
stitution proposed by Matsumoto had been rejected by SCAP on February 1, 1946.Ed.
"See my critique of the Matsumoto statement at the 24th plenary meeting of the
Commission on the Constitution which was held on December 11, 1962, in Kenipi
chsakai dai 24-kai s~kai gijiroku (Commission on the Constitution: Minutes of the
24th plenary meeting), at 26.
'Yoshida
was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Shidehara Cabinet
when the Matsumoto draft was presented to SCAP. Shirasu was vice-director of
the Bureau on Post-war Affairs (Shflsen renrakn jimnnkyoku). Hasegawa was an
officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [The report of the Commission on
the Constitution indicates only Yoshida and Shirasu were with Matsumoto at the
meeting. Kentp5 chsakai hikokusho fuzoku bunsho No. 2 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2), KEMP6 CH6SAKAI,
SEITEI NO KEII

NI KANSURU

SH6-IINKAI

HOKOKUSHO

(Commission

KEmP6

on the Constitu-

tion, Report of the committee relating to the history of the adoption of the Constitution) 396 (1964). But according to Tatsuo Sat6, Yoshida and Hasegawa were
with Matsumoto; no mention is made of Shirasu. Sat6, Nipponkoku kemnp5 seiritsushi (History of the formation of the Japanese Constitution), 82 JURISUTO 9,
13 (1955).-Ed.]
""In an article published in 1956, Professor Ward takes SCAP to task for
committing outrageous acts in order to impose the SCAP draft on the Japanese
government. See Ward, The Origin of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50
Amt. POL. Scr. REV. 980 (1956). I understand that this charge offended General
Whitney and former SCAP lawyers who claim it is totally unfounded. Professor
Ward has told me that his charge was based on an article by Tatsuo Sat6 in
JURISUTO which was based on the above Matsumoto statement and on no other
evidence. See Sat6, Nipponkoku kevzp5 seiritsushi (History of the formation of
the Japanese Constitution), 82 JuRisU'rO 9, 13 (1955). It was a bit humorous to
watch the strongest advocate of the imposed constitution thesis repeatedly cite the
Ward paper to prove it is recognized not only in Japan but internationally as well.
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Cabinet would accept the recommendation; he tried to determine from
Wataru Narahashi, the Minister of State and Cabinet Secretary,
whether Foreign Minister Yoshida belonged to the conservative or
liberal group. SCAP officers supposed that the Cabinet would resign
en masse if it did not accept the SCAP recommendation, and they had
discussed what measures should be taken if this happened. Indeed,
General MacArthur, recollecting the state of SCAP anxiety, wrote to
me on December 15, 1958: "Had the Japanese people, the Japanese
Emperor and the Japanese Government not supported me as they did,
the result would have been catastrophic."
In 1963, before I wrote my Opinion on Some ConstitutionalProblems, I surveyed all the evidence relating to the making of the Constitution. From this general survey emerged my "collaborative
theory." I concluded that the Japanese contributions to the collaboration were as follows:
I. Before the SCAP draft was proposed:
1. Article 9 had its origin in Tokyo, not in Washington. The idea
was first suggested by Prime Minister Shidehara, not by General
MacArthur.
2. Washington left the question of abolishing or retaining the position of the Emperor to the Japanese. Shidehara requested MacArthur to do his best to retain the system, and when 'MacArthur
ordered the Government Section to write a SCAP draft, he chose
to retain it. Although he made the choice at the ardent request of
Shidehara and others, MacArthur himself absolutely agreed with
Shidehara on this question. He has stated: 4
The preservation of the emperor system was my fixed idea. It was
inherent and integral to Japanese political and cultural survival. The
vicious efforts to destroy the person of the emperor and thereby abolish
the system became one of the most dangerous menaces that threatened
the successful rehabilitation of the nation.
II. After the delivery of the SCAP draft to the Japanese Government:
1. After much discussion, the Cabinet adopted MacArthur's recommendation that a Government Bill be drafted with the SCAP
"Letter

from General MacArthur to the author, then Chairman of the ComCHEsAKAi, KEmP6 CHOSAKAi H6KOKUSHO (Report of the Commission on the Constitution) 115 (1964), and Kempd
chlsakai hokokusho fuzoku bunsho No. 2 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2) KExP6 CHOSAKAI, KEmP6 SEITEI NO KEII NI
KAxSURU SHp-iiNKAI H6KOKUSHO (Commission on the Constitution, Report of the
committee relating to the history of the adoption of the Constitution) 314-17 (1964).

mission on the Constitution, printed in K~IP6
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draft as a model. MacArthur told Shidehara in an interview on
February 21, 1956, that the most important part of the SCAP
draft was the chapters on the Emperor and the renunciation of
war and that other parts could be fully discussed by Japanese and
American lawyers. It was so reported at the Cabinet meeting. The
Japanese Government Draft Bill deviated from the SCAP draft on
a few points, but for the most part it was a literal translation of
the latter. SCAP did not request that the Draft Bill take this
form; the Japanese government simply chose the easiest way.
2. Legislation enacted during the occupation for the democratization of Japan may be roughly classified into three categories:
(a) Legislation based on SCAP orders, such as the ShintJ Order,
where there was no room for any Japanese contribution.
(b) Legislation based on drafts made by the Japanese government, reviewed and approved by SCAP, such as that revising the
Civil Code.
(c) Drafts made by SCAP but amended by the Japanese government or the National Diet, such as the Anti-Monopoly and Labor
legislation and the amendment to the Commercial Code. Here
revision of SCAP drafts was allowed if considered reasonable and
proper by SCAP. Thus, room was left for Japanese contributions.
As chairman of the Commercial Law Division of the Legislative
Council (Hisei shingi-kai), I witnessed the process of discussion.
I remember that through discussion with SCAP lawyers I succeeded in having the SCAP drafts altered to no small extent.
For the drafting of the new Constitution, Washington desired the
use of method (b) and SCAP followed this policy until the beginning
of February 1946. With the rejection of the "Matsumoto Draft" and
the preparation of the SCAP draft by order of MacArthur, a shift was
made to method (c). Here SCAP was willing to listen to Japanese
opinions. At a meeting of the leading members of the House of Peers
and SCAP lawyers at the official residence of the President of the
House of Peers, I heard Kades say, "We are rather sorry that more
proposals for amendment have not been made in the Diet."
I was a member of the House of Peers at this time. A personal experience will serve to illustrate that method (c) was actually used.
I thought that the chapter on the Emperor was rather poorly drafted,
so that it might possibly create an awkward diplomatic situation. So I
went to see an officer in the Government Section, who had studied at
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Harvard Law School, as I had. We discussed in a friendly way and
on perfectly equal footing my proposal for amendment, written both
in English and Japanese. I asked him would it not be true that if the
President of the United States were to send an ambassador to Japan,
his credentials would be addressed to the Emperor, the Head of State
under the Bill as drawn? He agreed. I then pointed out that under
the Bill as drawn, should Japan send an ambassador to the United
States his credentials would be in the name of the Prime Minister, not
the Emperor who merely "attested" to the credentials. Would it not
be deviating, without any practical necessity, from the diplomatic
practice that the credentials of diplomatic envoys be addressed from
Head of State to Head of State? My friend agreed. I suggested that
the Emperor be empowered, with the consent and approval of the
Cabinet, to issue credentials; that this amendment would comply with
usual diplomatic practice without contravening the basic policy of the
Bill since it would not increase the political power of the Emperor in
any way. My friend personally agreed with me, but had to consult
with his colleagues.
A few days later I was told that if the House of Peers adopted my
proposed amendment, SCAP had no objection. So in the joint names
of Dr. Sabur6 Yamada, my teacher, and myself, the proposed amendment was presented before the House. Tokujir6 Kanamori' 5 opposed
our proposal with unusual eloquence; and since the chief government
spokesman opposed the amendment, many members of the Upper
House apparently supposed that it represented the intention of SCAP.
The proposal was rejected by the House by a majority vote. Thus the
present Constitution remained unamended, and my own attempted
contribution failed to bear fruit. 6
My theory of collaboration resulted from a survey of evidence such
as that mentioned above. Justice Tsuyoshi Mano of the Supreme
" Kanamori, a former Director of the Bureau of Legislation, became counsel to
the Shidehara Cabinet on March 26, 1946. He was later appointed the minister of
state in charge of constitutional problems on June 19, 1949. He held this position
as a member of the Yoshida Cabinet which succeeded the Shidehara Cabinet on
May 22, 1946 following the general election of April 10. He was commonly called
"the Constitutional Minister of State."--Ed.
" Before the vote, Shidehara came to my office and stated that he entirely approved of our propsed amendment; but since Kanamori threatened to resign if the
government did not support him, and the Cabinet could not dispense with this
highly efficient official, the government had to oppose the amendment. Shidehara,
therefore, wished to have the amendment proposal withdrawn. I consulted witl,
Yamada who insisted hat the proposal not be withdrawn, even though it would be
defeated. We understood the Prime Minister's awkward position, but refused to
follow his advice.

W1ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 961

Court, supported my analysis and cited further examples of Japanese
contributions. Most Commission members did not oppose my analysis,
although they kept silent, and of course no vote was taken. The
opposition expressed was largely linguistic, for example, whether the
word "gassaku" (joint-work) was appropriate. Opponents felt that
there could not be any gassaku between a superior and a subordinate.
I used the word on the assumption that in intellectual matters the
word "gassaku" could properly be employed even as between the
superior and the inferior in rank. An essay published in the joint
names of a professor and his pupil might be called gassaku if both
collaborated in its preparation. However, I did not succeed in perssuading opposing members.
Moreover, political considerations were involved. "Oshitsuke"
(imposition by force) was a frequently employed and valuable slogan
for stimulating national sentiment for constitutional amendment. If
gassaku became the dominant view, it would deprive the revisionists
of one of the most effective weapons in their armory. The vehemence
with which the gassaku theory was opposed by a few of the members
might be accounted for by this very fact.
Subsequently, opposition from another quarter appeared. While admitting that the analysis was correct, so far as the role of SCAP was
concerned, some opponents asserted that there was no distinction between an "order" and a "recommendation." I am skeptical about this
view, based solely on authoritarian conceptions, which ignores the
rational considerations which prevailed when discussion was conducted
between SCAP officers and Japanese lawyers.
However, there is this much truth in the authoritarian view: Not
only was there a language barrier; there existed also the barrier between lawyers trained in the common law and lawyers trained in the
civil law. There was not one lawyer in the Government Section nor
among Japanese negotiators who had mastered the "two ways of thinking" as had Lord MacMillan, John H. Wigmore, or Roscoe Pound.
The Japanese lawyers who tried to influence the occupation lawyers
had to present their opinions according to the common law way of
thinking. If they employed a civilian's logic in English translation, it
was not well understood and was in danger of being rejected. The final
say was after all in the SCAP officers. Under such circumstances the
Japanese lawyers might well have felt that SCAP "imposed" its views
on them, disregarding their own which they believed to be correct.
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MY "POLITICAL MANIFESTO" INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE NINE
Article 9 states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
In 1946, I believed that Article 9 was imposed on Japan in order to
perpetuate the disarmament policy embodied in the Potsdam Declaration by placing that policy in the more permanent Constitution. But
after making a survey of the evidence of which I was totally ignorant
in 1946, I later found my belief to be completely erroneous.
While I felt that on the whole the Government Bill was moderate,
Article 9 struck me as a bit too radical. At a meeting of the Special
Committee on the Constitution, I put a series of questions to Tokujir6
Kanamori, the government spokesman, on the possible implications
of Article 9. I did this in order to ascertain what was the official
interpretation of the Article. I gathered from his replies that the
official interpretation was that Japan retained a right of national selfdefense in international law, but by virtue of the second paragraph,
she could neither wage war nor maintain an armed force-even for
purposes of national self-defense. I felt dubious about this explanation. In effect, it was superficial and unrealistic. However, on the
assumpti6n that this was its meaning, I stated at a plenary session
that Article 9 would be reasonable only when a world authority came
into being which could guarantee the security of each nation. I expressed my ardent desire that such an authority might emerge as early
as possible.
The official governmental interpretation was adopted by leading
professors of constitutional law and it gradually became communis
opinio doctorum (I once characterized it as communis error doctorum). It was so taught not only in university law schools but also
in civic education in junior and senior high schools. Under this interpretation Article 9 was well received by the general public, and the
Constitution has been termed the "peace constitution." The doctrine
of communis opinio doctorum seemed to be welcomed by popular
sentiment rather than by reason.
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When the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces Law17 was
hotly discussed in the National Diet and the press, the constitutional
lawyers who had adopted the official interpretation in their commentaries and text books concluded that the law was unconstitutional.
Lawyers of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation also followed the official interpretation, but evaded its logical consequence by the use of
legal fictions-a technique well-known to the old Roman law as well as
the common law. But the ordinary citizen did not understand; the
government was attacked for its audacity in subverting the Constitution by telling "lies" palpable to all.
In 1953 a meeting was held at the University of Tokyo to hear both
sides in the heated dispute relating to the constitutionality of the SelfDefense Forces Law. Hitoshi Ashida, who had been the Chairman of
the Special Committee on the Constitution of the House of Representatives, and I were called to defend the very unpopular thesis that
the law was constitutional.
Ashida had rewritten Article 9 in the Lower House so as to make
possible at some future time the interpretation that it does not apply in
the case of national self-defense and international sanction. He had in
mind a similar interpretation of the Kellogg Pact.'
When he expressed his view that the Self-Defense Forces Law was not unconstitutional, a few commentators charged that he was a turncoat. It was
alleged that he had changed his own interpretation, originally the same
as the official one, expressed at the plenary session of the Lower
House. The falsity of this charge is proved by a pamphlet entitled
Interpretationof the New Constitution (Shin kempJ no kaishaku) published as early as October 1946, in which Ashida set forth an interpretation entirely different from the official one, though he did not expressly refer to the second paragraph of Article 9.
I had made some comments critical of the official interpretation of
Article 9 in the House of Peers. At the Tokyo University meeting I
took a bolder position, asserting that the official interpretation was
totally wrong. I agreed with Ashida that Article 9 did not apply in the
case of national self-defense. Ashida relied chiefly on the wording of
the text which he had written and which was susceptible to two irreconcilably antagonistic interpretations. Adopting the sociological
method of constitutional interpretation, similar to Brandeis' use of
"VJieitaih5 (Self-defense forces law) (Law No. 165, 1954).
' 8 Briand-Kellogg Pact, Aug. 27, 1928.
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sociological brief in Muller v. Oregon,'9 I declared that Article 9 was
in the nature of a political manifesto addressed to the world as well as
the nation-even though it was found in the body of the Constitution
and not the Preamble. 0 If the Article were interpreted as a political
manifesto and not as an ordinary legal provision, the National Diet
might or might not retain armed forces for defensive purposes. This,
being a realistic political question to be discussed against the background of the actual situation prevailing among nations, is not really a
constitutional question. This method of interpretation was adopted by
me in the spirit of Chief Justice Marshall who warned American lawyers not to forget that it was a "constitution"-not a commercial law
or the terms of a lease-that they were expounding.
This, however, is not to deprive the Article of its high importance. It
is a manifesto with an eye to the future welfare of mankind. Article 9
does not indeed enjoin the National Diet, making Japan a lamb in the
company of wolves. The manifesto is a world ideal which cannot be realized by Japan alone, but only by the joint endeavors of all nations.
"208 U.S. 412 (1908).
'In
this connection it is interesting to note the following dialogue between
Dr. Matsumoto and General Whitney at a meeting held on February 22, 1946:
Matsumnoto: Might the Renunciation of War be inserted somewhere in the
Preamble, rather than be given a chapter of its own?
General Whitney: The Renunciation of War was placed deliberately in a
separate chapter in order to give all the emphasis possible to this important
article. As I stated to Mr. Yoshida, and the Supreme Commander stated to
Shidehara yesterday, this article affords Japan the opportunity to assume the
moral leadership of the world in the movement toward lasting peace. The Renunciation of War should not be buried amongst the enunciation of other
principles; rather, it must be stated boldly in order to serve its full purpose,
General MacArthur feels that this principle will do more to attract the favorable
attention of the world than anything else. And this is a time in which Japan
needs the favorable attention of the world.
Matsumoto: It would be less unsuitable if it were written in the Preamble. It
is unusual to have this principle stated in the body of the Constitution rather
than in the Preamble.
Comniander Hussey: You mean, Dr. Matsumoto, that you would prefer to have
it stated merely as a principle?
Matsumoto: Yes, that is so.
Cominander Hussey: While we appreciate that position, we feel that the renunciation should be incorporated in the basic law itself, that this would give
it real force.
General Whitney: The enunciation of this principle should be unusual and
dramatic. We made it Chapter II rather than Chapter I of the Constitution in'
deference to the emperor and his place in the hearts of the Japanese people.
For my own part, and in terms of its decisive importance, I would prefer the
Renunciation of War to be Chapter I of the new Constitution.
[As to who were the Japanese participants at this meeting, see note 12, supra. See
Kempo chosakai h~kokushto fuzoku bunsho No. 2 (Report of the Commission on the
Constitution, Attached Document No. 2) KEMP6 CE16SAKAI, KEMP6 SEITEI NO KE11

NI KAINSURU SH6 IINRAI H6KOKUSHO

(Commission on the Constitution, Report of

the committee relating to the history of the adoption of the Constitution) 369-71
(1964), for a description of the other topics discussed at the meeting.-Ed.]
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Such were the ideas underlying my "political manifesto" interpretation of Article 9. This "double-tracked" theory, which took account of
ideals as well as reality, was not acceptable to jurists who thought that
the method of interpreting the Commercial Code and the Constitution
must be identical. For them the literal interpretation of the text was
the only way of protecting the Constitution.
Nonetheless, as noted above, before the Commission began its studies on the making of the Constitution, I believed Article 9 was imposed
upon Japan. I no longer hold that view.
SWNCC 22821 clearly indicated that the American Government had
no intention of imposing Article 9 on Japan. Its origin was in Tokyo,
not in Washington. It originated in an interview between MacArthur
and Shidehara on January 24, 1946. It was believed even by persons
officially closest to Shidehara that he visited MacArthur merely to
express his thanks for the penicillin which had been procured by the
General for the Prime Minister. But in fact Shidehara requested the
interview in connection with the forthcoming Constitution.
No one else was present at the interview which continued for some
three hours. Shidehara astonished the General with a proposal for the
insertion of a renunciation-of-war and disarmament clause into the
new Constitution. Apparently the General hesitated at first because of
the possible deleterious effects on United States foreign policy in Eastern Asia, if the proposal were approved. The Prime Minister, however, succeeded in persuading the General that in the atomic age the
survival of mankind should precede all national strategies; that if an
atomic war should break out, America herself might be destroyed; that
other nations must follow the same principle of renouncing war if they
themselves were to survive. MacArthur was deeply impressed by this
part of Shidehara's argument. Before the SCAP draft and the Japanese Government Bill were drawn, the General and the Prime Minister agreed to insert such a clause in the new Constitution.
The original draft of Article 9 was made by MacArthur himself
"SWNCC The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Document No. 228.
This report, entitled Reform of the Japanese Government System, was approved
by SWNCC on January 7, 1946. It was forwarded to General MacArthur, Commander in Chief, U.S. Armed Forces, Pacific, for his "information" on January
11, 1946. The full text is found in Keinpd chzsakai hokokusho fnuzoku bunsho
No. 2 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2)
KEMPO CHOSAKAI, KEIMP6 SEITEI NO KEII NI KANSURU SHO-IINKAI HOKOKUSHO

(Com-

mission on the Constitution, Report of the committee relating to the history of the
adoption of the Constitution) 677 (1964). A summary is printed in THE FAR
EASTERN Co ,sISSlON, A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, 1945 to 1952 (Dep't
of State Pub. 5138), at 45.-Ed.
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based on the conversation of January 24 before he ordered the Government Section to draw up a. Model Draft. MacArthur's original
draft was revised by lawyers of the Government Section, notably by
striking out the phrase "even for self preservation."22 The SCAP draft
which included this revised text of Article 9 was handed over, with
MacArthur's approval, to the Japanese Government on February 13,
1946.
This picture emerged after I made a survey of all the relevant evidence. If this general picture is true, can it be said that Article 9 was
"imposed" on Japan? I gave up the belief that I had entertained in
1946.
Before Shidehara talked with MacArthur on January 24, 1946, he
had not consulted with anyone, including his Foreign Minister, Shigeru
Yoshida. At a Cabinet meeting on February 22, reporting the results
of his interview with MacArthur on the previous day, Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were proposed by MacArthur, although he never
clearly said so. If he had said that the proposal was his and not
MacArthur's, it might have been rejected by the Cabinet. Shidehara
was diplomatic enough to know this. So Cabinet members who attended the meeting, including Yoshida and Ashida, thought that the
proposal was made by MacArthur and not by Shidehara. After this
meeting, Shidehara told a number of his close friends that "Article 9
did not come from abroad" and that it was his own proposal. Neither
Yoshida nor Ashida was aware that the original proposal was made by
Shidehara. They thought, as I did at the time, that it was "imposed"
by the Allied Powers. These events account for the difference between
Ashida's public statement at the plenary session and his private opinion in his pamphlet, and Yoshida's written memorandum sent to the
Commission on the Constitution which denied that the Article was
Shidehara's.
23
In a letter of December 1, 1958, I stated to MacArthur:
As for the much talked about Article 9, I understand General MacArthur, as well as Baron Shidehara, was thinking not only in terms of a
basic Japanese policy but in terms of the shape of things which ought to
come in the world at large. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution should
"Kenpa chsaki hokokusho fuzoku bunsho No. 2 (Report of the Commission on
the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2) KEm56 CHOSAKI, I.EMfP6 SEIrEI NO KEI
NI KANSURU SHO-IINRAI HOKOKUSHO (Commission on the Constitution, Report of
the committee relating to the history of the adoption of the Constitution) 322

(1964).--Ed.
I For differing views as to who proposed Article 9, see id, at 323-38.-Ed.
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serve as a model for the future constitution of every country in the world.
Otherwise mankind may perish in this atomic era.
In reply, MacArthur wrote to me on December 5, 1958 :24
Your impressions are correct. Nothing in Article 9 prevents any and
all necessary steps for the preservation of the safety of the nation. I
stated this at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and later
recommended a Defense Force be organized of ten divisions with corresponding elements of the sea and air forces. The article was aimed
entirely at foreign aggression and was to give spiritual leadership to
the world. It will stand everlastingly as a monument to the foresight.
the statesmanship and the wisdom of Prime Minister Shidehara.
It is clear from the above that MacArthur's interpretations of Article 9 is antagonistic to the official Japanese interpretation as stated
by Kanamori at the Imperial Diet. MacArthur's interpretation accidentally agrees with my own, arrived at quite independently without
any knowledge of the SCAP view.

2

Id. at 321.-Ed.

